内容简介：We investigate when, and more importantly, why the disclosure of tax-related critical audit matters deters corporates’aggressive tax behaviors. In this paper, we develop a novel framework to model corporates’tax behaviors and document the proposition that the disclosure of tax-related critical audit matters deters corporates’aggressive tax behaviors through the increasing costs of the behaviors, and also find that corporates whose aggressive tax planning is disclosed in the critical audit matters assume higher effective tax rate compared to corporates whose aggressive tax planning isn’t disclosed in the critical audit matters, namely the disclosure of tax-related critical audit matters attenuates corporate tax avoidance. Using a unique dataset of Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai Security Exchange and Shenzhen Security Exchange over the period 2017-2022, we employ the proxies of tax aggressiveness as book-tax difference (BTD) and book effective tax rate (BETR) in the baseline regression and find that our baseline results are consistent with the proposition. To address endogeneity and robustness concerns, we structure an innovative instrument variable based on the requirements of relevance and exogeneity to calibrate the results of baseline regression, utilize several alternative proxies of tax aggressiveness in the robust regression to examine the proposition, and find our baseline results robust.

主讲人：汪利锬，上海立信会计金融学院副教授，上海财经大学经济学博士，在Industrial Marketing Management、Finance Research Letters、Emerging Market Finance and Trade、《财贸经济》《中国经济问题》《公共管理学报》《经济学动态》《财经研究》《中央财经大学学报》等ABS 3、JCR1、CSSCI检索期刊发表多篇学术论文，曾连续两次获得校级教学成果一等奖（2017年度和2019年度），兼任Finance Research Letters、British Accounting Review、China Finance Review International、《会计研究》《经济学》季刊《财贸经济》《经济学动态》《会计与经济研究》等学术期刊的匿名审稿人和《中国金融评论》评阅人。

沙龙时间：2024年5月22日（周三）13:00

沙龙地点：文翔路校区序伦大楼教发中心5012